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I. INTRODUCTION
Syas: [Will [the roll call vote of judicial nominating commissions] be
available to the general public [or] will it be shielded from the gen-
eral public? I want [the] roll call vote available to the general pub-
lic which is the press.
Carstens: Well... [t]here wouldn't be any purpose in taking ... a roll call
vote, oral or written, in secret.
Cline Williams-Flavel A. Wright and Warren C. (Bud) Johnson Professor of Law,
University of Nebraska. The author filed an amicus brief on behalf of the Ne-
braska Civil Liberties Union in Marks v. Judicial Nominating Comm'n, 236 Neb.
429, 461 N.W.2d 551 (1990).
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Syas: No, there wouldn't be, only... I want the nominating committee
to understand our intent is that this be made available to the gen-
eral public through the press. An oral roll call vote by each one of
their names, how they vote, yes or no.
Carstens: I would go along with you 100% that that is the intent of the bill as
I have it. 1
When the Nebraska Legislature enacted the current statutes regu-
lating judicial nominating commissions, it was 100 percent certain that
the statutes required commissions to select or reject candidates for ju-
dicial office through a public roll call vote. Last October, 100 percent
of the Nebraska Supreme Court was certain that those same statutes
permit, and indeed may require, judicial nominating commissions to
conduct their voting in secret.2
This Article will explore this strange state of affairs. The Article
will first analyze Marks v. Judicial Nominating Commission,3 the
case in which the supreme court decided that the voting of judicial
nominating commissions could be conducted in secret. The analysis
will demonstrate that the supreme court's result could not be reached
by any fair-minded reading of the Nebraska statutes. In Marks, the
supreme court decided to implement its own notion of how judicial
nominating commissions should operate, even though the Legislature
had clearly indicated that its opinion was different. The Article will
then discuss why the Marks case is important: why it is important to
the process of nominating judges in this state and why it is important
as an interpretation of Nebraska's public meetings law.4 Finally, the
Article will discuss options for limiting the damage caused by the
supreme court through the Marks decision.
II. THE DECISION
The judicial nominating process in the Marks case was not unusual
in any way.5 In early 1987, the Nebraska Supreme Court declared a
1. Floor Debate on LB 110, March 23,1973, p. 1847. Senator Carstens was the princi- r
pal sponsor of LB 110. 1973 NEB. LEGIS. J. 95.
2. Marks v. Judicial Nominating Comm'n, 236 Neb. 429, 461 N.W.2d 551 (1990).
3. Id.
4. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 84-1408 to 84-1414 (Reissue 1987).
5. Most of the procedure described below follows the procedure prescribed by the
Nebraska Constitution, art. V, § 21, and the Nebraska statutes. NEB. REV. STAT.
§§ 24-801 to 24-812.01 (Reissue 1989). It is more difficult to know what occurs
when judicial nominating commissions go into private session, specifically for our
purposes to know the precise voting procedure used, but since a Nebraska
Supreme Court Justice chairs each commission and the Constitution, art. V,
§ 21(5), and statutes, NEB. REV. STAT. § 24-809, require an oral roll call vote, it is
reasonable to assume that the voting procedure used in this case is the same or
very similar to the voting procedure used by other judicial nominating commis-
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judicial vacancy for the County Court in the Twentieth Judicial Dis-
trict. Nominations for the vacancy were solicited and the names of
four candidates were forwarded for consideration. The judicial nomi-
nating commission, composed of Supreme Court Judge D. Nick
Caporale6 and eight other members,7 met on March 27, 1987, to con-
sider the nominees. The first part of the meeting was the public hear-
ing at which the commission accepted comments from the public on
the qualifications of the nominees. After the public hearing, the com-
mission went into a private session.8 During the private session, the
commission first interviewed each of the nominees individually. Then
the commission, with only commission members present, deliberated
and voted on each of the nominees. For each nominee, Judge
Caporale orally called the name of each member of the commission
and recorded the vote of that member on that nominee. Two of the
four nominees received the votes of at least five commission members
and the commission forwarded the names of those two nominees to
the Governor for her consideration.9 The plaintiff, James Marks, was
a member of the public who challenged the secret voting procedure
under the public meetings law.
Judge Boslaugh wrote the Marks decision for a unanimous
supreme court, with retired District Judge Colwell sitting in for Judge
Caporale.10 Judge Boslaugh first considered the provisions of the Ne-
braska statutes on judicial nominating commissions.11 He began by
noting that section 24-809 of the statutes, as required by article V, sec-
tion 21(5) of the Nebraska Constitution, obliges judicial nominating
sions. The draft manual for commissioners describes the procedure as it was fol-
lowed in Marks, including a secret roll call vote. Office of the Nebraska State
Court Administrator, Commissioner's Manua: Nebraska Judicial Nominating
Commission (proposed August, 1990, for supreme court approval).
6. Judge Caporale was a non-voting member of the commission and its chair. NEB.
REv. STAT. § 24-809 (Reissue 1989).
7. This judicial nominating commission, and judicial nominating commissions gen-
erally, are composed of the chair who is a judge from the Nebraska Supreme
Court; four lawyer members, with not more than two from the same political
party; and four citizen members, also with not more than two from the same
political party. NEB. REV. STAT. § 24-803(2) & (3)(Reissue 1989).
8. Private sessions are specifically authorized by the statutes regulating judicial
nominating commissions. NEB. REV. STAT. § 24-810(3)(Reissue 1989).
9. The precise voting procedure used in this case was disclosed in an affidavit filed
in the case by Judge Caporale. The judge who eventually was appointed to this
vacancy by the Governor later received the lowest evaluation of any judge in the
state on the state bar's judicial evaluation process, "Results: 1990 Judicial Per-
formance Evaluation," NSBA NEws 17,28 (July 1990)(lowest rating was on ulti-
mate question of whether judge should be retained), and was not retained by the
voters in his first retention election. Omaha World-Herald, Nov. 8, 1990, at 25,
col. 6.
10. Because Judge Caporale was a member of the judicial nominating commission
whose actions were challenged in the case, he recused himself from the case.
11. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 24-801 to 24-812.01 (Reissue 1989).
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commissions to make their decisions to select or reject judicial nomi-
nees through a roll call vote. Judge Boslaugh noted that neither the
statute nor the constitution explicitly required that the roll call vote
be taken in public and that a later section of the statutes provided that
communications between members of judicial nominating commis-
sions are to be confidential. Although he never completes the argu-
ment, Judge Boslaugh hints that the failure of the statutes explicitly
to require a public roll call vote coupled with their protection of the
confidentiality of member communications authorizes, if indeed it
does not require, that the roll call vote be taken in secret. Judge Bos-
laugh went on to cite section 24-810 which requires judicial nominat-
ing commissions to hold a public hearing 2 and which authorizes them
to hold "such additional private or confidential meetings as [they] de-
termine to be necessary."' 3 He concluded by finding that the statutes
are "plain, direct and unambiguous" on the procedures to be followed
by judicial nominating commissions. The commissions "may select or
reject judicial nominees, after the public hearing, in a private or confi-
dential meeting, provided the vote is taken by an oral rollcall [sic]."'4
Judge Boslaugh then proceeded to discuss the public meetings law
which provided the legal base for Marks' claim.' 5 The public meetings
law, on its face, quite clearly applies to judicial nominating commis-
sions1 6 and seems to require a public roll call vote.17 Nevertheless, the
court held that the public meeting law did not require judicial nomi-
nating commissions to vote in public for two reasons. First, the court
relied on the maxim that statutes relating to a particular subject take
precedence over general statutes. Thus, the court held that the provi-
sions of the statutes relating particularly to judicial nominating com-
missions took precedence over the general procedural requirements of
the public meetings law. The authorization of the former statutes to
conduct a roll call vote in secret overrode the requirement of the lat-
ter statutes that the roll call be conducted in public. Second, the court
held that the public meetings law did not apply to the type of decisions
that are made by judicial nominating commissions. The court held
that the requirements of the public meetings law only apply when
12. NEB. REV. STAT. § 24-810(2)(Reissue 1989).
13. NEB. REV. STAT. § 24-810(3)(Reissue 1989).
14. Marks v. Judicial Nominating Conm'n, 236 Neb. 429, 432, 461 N.W.2d 551, 553
(1990).
15. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 84-1408 to 84-1414 (Reissue 1987).
16. The public meetings law applies to "public bodies" and public bodies are defined
by the law to include "all independent ... commissions . .. now or hereafter
created by the Constitution of Nebraska, statute, or otherwise pursuant to law."
NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-1409(1)(Cum. Supp. 1990).
17. "Any action taken [by a public body] shall be by roll call vote of the public body in
open session, and the record shall state how each member voted, or if the member
was absent or not voting." NEB. REv. STAT. § 84-1413(2)(Reissue 1981).
[Vol. 70:277
JUDICIAL NOMINATING COMMITTEE
"public policy" decisions are being made and that selecting nominees
for judicial vacancies does not involve the formation of "public policy."
Thus, the public meetings law simply did not apply to the decisions of
judicial nominating commissions, or at least not to their decisions to
select or reject judicial nominees.
The Nebraska Supreme Court held, then, that the public meetings
law had not been violated when the judicial nominating commission in
the Marks case made its decisions on nominees in secret.
III. ANALYSIS
The Nebraska public meetings law provided the legal base for the
claim in Marks that judicial nominating commissions were required to
conduct their voting in public. Thus, the Nebraska Supreme Court
could have decided the case solely within the terms of that law with-
out raising issues under the statutory and constitutional provisions
regulating judicial nominating commissions.' 8 But the court did not
do that. Instead, it based its holding that the public meetings law did
not require public votes, in part, on an interpretation of the laws regu-
lating judicial nominating commissions. Thus, analysis of the Marks
decision must consider both the public meetings law and the constitu-
tional and statutory provisions regulating judicial nominating
commissions.
In Marks, the Nebraska Supreme Court decided (1) that the Ne-
braska Constitution and statutes permitted (and perhaps required)' 9
the votes of judicial nominating commissions to be taken in secret and
(2) that the plain language of the public meetings law requiring public
votes was overridden by the more specific laws regulating judicial
18. For example, the court could have based its decision that the public meetings law
did not apply solely on the rationale that that law only applied to "public policy"
decisions and judicial nominating commissions were not engaged in making that
type of decision.
19. The Nebraska Supreme Court held that the open voting required by the public
meetings law was overridden by the statutes regulating judicial nominating com-
missions. There are only three possibilities for the effect of the latter statutes on
the voting procedures of judicial nominating commissions. First, the statutes
could be interpreted to require open voting, which would mean that there was no
conflict between the two sets of statutes and no reason for one to override the
other. Second, the statutes could be silent on the issue of whether judicial nomi-
nating commissions are required to vote in public, which once again would mean
that there was no conflict between the two sets of statutes and no reason for one
to override the other. Third, the statutes could require judicial nominating com-
missions to vote in secret, which would mean that there is a conflict between the
two sets of statutes necessitating a decision about which should control. Thus,
although the supreme court never states this directly, its decision could be inter-
preted to mean that the statutory and constitutional provisions regulating judicial
nominating commissions require judicial nominating commissions to vote in se-
cret. See infra notes 63-94 and accompanying text.
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nominating commissions and by language in the intent section of the
public meetings law.
The supreme court was wrong on both counts. The Nebraska Con-
stitution and statutes do not permit secret votes by judicial nominating
commissions. Indeed, Nebraska law requires exactly the opposite; Ne-
braska law requires judicial nominating commissions to select or re-
ject nominees through a public roll call vote. The plain language of
the public meetings law also requires a public vote. That language
should not be overridden by the laws which regulate judicial nominat-
ing commissions since the need to override arises only when there is a
conflict between two laws and here both laws require a public vote.
The argument that the plain language of the public meetings law
should be overridden by language in the intent section of the law is
novel and unprecedented and causes concern because it poses a serious
threat to the continued viability of the public meetings law.
Many cases are wrongly decided. This case, however, is more
troubling than most, not because of the result reached (although that
is unfortunate), but because the supreme court refused to deal mean-
ingfully with the arguments that were presented to it.
A. What Does It Mean to Require a Roll Call Vote?
The Nebraska Constitution and state statute both require judicial
nominating commissions to select or reject nominees through a roll
call vote.20 Thus, a natural first question to ask is what does it mean
to require a roll call vote? Why is it that the roll call vote requirement
was redundantly placed in Nebraska law?
The overriding reason for requiring roll call votes is to ensure that
the votes of individual voters are made public. Every manual on pro-
cedure that discusses how to choose between various voting methods
indicates that the purpose of a roll call vote is to ensure that votes are
made public. The statement on roll call votes in Keesey's Modern Par-
liamentary Procedure provides an example of the kind of statement
that is made in procedural manuals: "Most people have witnessed dull
and time-consuming roll call votes at televised national political con-
ventions. It is a slow method of voting... and is justified only when it
is desirable to make public the members' votes."2' 1
This rationale for requiring roll call votes is reinforced by several
Nebraska statutes, including the public meetings law. Roll call votes
20. NEB. CONST. art. V, § 21(5); NEB. REV. STAT. § 24-809 (Reissue 1989).
21. R. KEEsEY, MODERN PARLIAmENTARY PROCEDURE 135 (1974)(emphasis added).
See also H. ROBERT, ROBERT's RULES OF ORDER, NEwLY REVISED 353 (1970); H.
DAvDsON, HANDBOOK OF PARLiAENTARY PROCEDURE 74 (2d ed., 1968); L.
BRIDGE, THE FUNK & WAGNALUs BOOK OF PARLIAMENTARY PROCEDURE 51-52
(1954).
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are required by the public meetings law22 and by other Nebraska stat-
utes,23 but the Legislature has added the following qualifying lan-
guage to the roll call vote requirements contained in the statutes:
"The requirements of a roll call... vote shall be satisfied by a [voting
body] which utilizes an electronic voting device which allows the yeas
and nays of each [voter] to be readily seen by the public."24 This quali-
fying language indicates, as do the procedural manuals, that the pur-
pose of a roll call vote is to ensure that votes are made public.
Through this qualifying language, the Nebraska Legislature has indi-
cated that when it requires a roll call vote, its concern is not with
whether names are called before votes are cast-the Legislature re-
quires a roll call vote to enable the public to know how individual vot-
ers voted.23
This concern with the publicness of votes--and pursuing that con-
cern through a roll call vote requirement-rests on a firm policy basis.
Public votes are intended to ensure that the required number of voters
vote for a measure, to make voters feel the responsibility of their ac-
tion when important issues are voted upon, and to compel each voter
to bear her portion of the responsibility for the action taken.2 6 All of
these purposes are undermined if, as in the present case, the roll call
vote is taken in secret and active steps are taken to ensure that the
particulars of the vote are never known by the public. First, the pub-
lic cannot rely on the roll call vote itself to ensure that the majority
required by the constitution for forwarding a name to the Governor
was or was not met by a candidate; instead, the public must rely on the
assurances of the commission itself which, of course, could be in error
inadvertently. Second, the heightened sense of responsibility the roll
call vote is designed to create in commissions is undermined if com-
missions can hide their votes from the public; the self-perceived need
of commissions to consider and justify their actions carefully is re-
duced if the determinative votes can be cast in secret and forever hid-
22. NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-1413(2)(Reissue 1987).
23. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 16-503, 17-616, 84-1413(2)(Reissue 1987).
24. Id.
25. The qualifying language quoted in the text is not included as part of the language
of the constitution or the statutes requiring judicial nominating commissions to
use a roll call vote. As will be well documented below, however, that does not
mean that the Legislature's intent with the roll call vote requirement as applied
to judicial nominating commissions was different than its intent when it requires
a roll call vote by other bodies. See in fra notes 27-56 and accompanying text. The
qualifying language was not added to the roll call vote requirement that applies to
judicial nominating commissions simply because the commissions are so small
and meet so infrequently that the use of electronic voting devices was very
improbable.
26. See, City of Valentine v. Valentine Motel, Inc., 176 Neb. 63, 67, 125 N.W.2d 98, 101
(1963); Hammon v. Dixon, 232 Ark. 537, 539-41, 338 S.W.2d 941, 944 (1960); Board
of Educ. v. Best, 52 Ohio St. 138, 153-55, 39 N.E. 694, 697 (1894).
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den from public scrutiny. And third, the individual sense of
responsibility a roll call vote is designed to create is subverted if the
individual votes of commission members are never disclosed to the
public; the public only knows the collective decisions of commissions
and, without knowing how they voted, can never hold individual com-
mission members responsible for their share of the collective
decisions.
In the Marks opinion, the court did not explore the question of why
judicial nominating commissions are required to use the roll call
method of voting. It did not discuss the reason the procedural manu-
als give for such a requirement-to ensure that votes are made public;
it did not discuss the Legislature's acceptance of that reason; it did not
discuss the policies supporting a roll call vote requirement. Nor did
the court tell us what purposes are served by a secret roll call vote; the
court did not tell us why the constitution and statutes would require
such a counterintuitive procedure or what public policies are served by
such a procedure. Instead, the court merely quoted the language of
the statutes and then stated, without analysis, that they plainly, di-
rectly, and unambiguously permit a secret roll call vote. So the next
obvious question is, do they?
B. Do the Nebraska Constitution and Statutes Permit a Secret Roll Call
Vote?
Both the Nebraska Constitution and the statutes require judicial
nominating commissions to vote by roll call.27 In Marks, the court rec-
ognized this, as it must, but held that the roll call vote can be taken in
secret because later sections of the statutes authorize private or confi-
dential meetings28 and provide that communications between mem-
bers of judicial nominating commissions shall be confidential.29
The Nebraska Supreme Court was wrong here for two reasons.
First, the court relied on statutory provisions to hold that the roll call
votes can be taken in secret. The constitution does not include lan-
guage similar to that found in the statutes and, obviously, cannot be
overridden by statutory language. Hence, if the constitution requires
a public vote, and it clearly does, the court's reliance on the statutory
language is misplaced. Second, even within the statutory framework
itself, the court is wrong. The court's holding is premised on the belief
that it is necessary to hold the roll call vote in secret to ensure that the
policies of the other statutory provisions can be met. But that belief is
in error. The policies of the other statutes can be met even if a public
roll call vote is held, and the Legislature made it abundantly clear
27. NEB. CONST. art. 5, § 21(5); NEB. REv. STAT. § 24-809 (Reissue 1989).
28. NEB. REV. STAT. § 24-810(3)(Reissue 1989).
29. NEB. REV. STAT. § 24-812 (Reissue 1989).
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when it enacted the provisions in issue that it intended the roll call
vote to be public.
1. Does the Nebraska Constitution Require a Public Roll Call
Vote?
The Nebraska Constitution requires that members of judicial nom-
inating commissions "vote for the nominee of their choice by roll
call."30 As indicated in the previous section,3 1 in the absence of any
other information about what was meant by the roll call vote require-
ment, the bald requirement in the constitution should be interpreted
to require a vote in public. The reason roll call votes are required is to
ensure that votes are public. There is no reason to think that the pur-
pose here was different. Nevertheless, if there is lingering doubt
about what the roll call vote requirement means, reference to the en-
actment history of the constitutional provision is appropriate. That
history makes it very clear that the provision was intended to require
a public vote.
The framers of this section of the constitution intended that the
roll call vote be taken in public. Article V, section 21(5) was one of the
amendments made to the merit plan for the selection of state judges in
1972. The amendments were proposed by the Legislature through LB
1199.32 The language of LB 1199 as originally introduced in the Legis-
lature, however, did not include the language requiring judicial nomi-
nating commissions to hold a roll call vote.3 3 On February 10, 1972, at
the public hearing on LB 1199 before the Committee on Constitutional
Revision, the following interchange occurred between Mr. Arlan
Beam, who was speaking in favor of the bill on behalf of the Nebraska
State Bar Association and Senator George Syas, Chair of the
Committee:
Beam: I think that Senator Carstens did lay out the bill; and if ... there
are some ideas from within the Legislature or outside in the peo-
ple who think that they could come up with some ideas that would
improve the situation ....
Syas: I tell you what I would like to have in here: why don't you put in
here by amendment that when the committee votes, they do it by
roll call vote that is public, instead of this secret ballot? And, I
wish to emphasize that the Legislature and all subdivisions have to
go through roll call vote, I don't see why they can't.
Beam: Okay, I will make a note of that, Senator Syas.3 4
In response to this interchange, the Committee on Constitutional
30. NEB. CONsT. art. V, § 21(5).
31. See supra notes 20-26 and accompanying text.
32. 1972 Neb. Laws 795.
33. LB 1199, 82d Leg., 2d Sess., 1972 Nebraska Laws.
34. February 10, 1972, Committee on Constitutional Revision hearing on LB 1199, p.
4.
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Revision amended LB 1199 to add the current language requiring a
roll call vote.3 5 On March 9, 1972, the Legislature adopted the amend-
ment.3 6 In the debate on that day, Senator Syas once again indicated,
albeit more indirectly, that the roll call vote was to be taken in public:
Syas: The roll call vote, everybody else in this state government has to
have a roll call vote and the Legislature and all subdivisions of
government. We didn't think these people should be any different,
the judiciary or the judicial nominating committee should be any
different than other people that hold state, county or local govern-
ment, whether it's paid or not.3 7
Although Senator Syas did not indicate explicitly on this day that
the roll call vote should be taken in pubic, he did say that the voting of
judicial nominating commissions should be treated the same as the
voting of the Legislature and political subdivisions. Then, as well as
now, voting in the Legislature and in political subdivisions had to be
conducted in public.38 The framers of article V, section 21(5) of the
Nebraska Constitution intended the voting of judicial nominating
commissions to be treated the same as the voting of other public bod-
ies in Nebraska-to be public.
The history of article V, section 21(5), then, clearly indicates that
its framers intended the roll call vote required by that section to be
conducted in public. I have been unable to find any evidence in the
language or history of the amendment that indicates any intention to
permit the roll call vote to be taken in secret.
The Nebraska Constitution, then, is clear. It requires judicial nom-
inating commissions to vote for or against nominees for judicial office
in public. The court's argument in Marks that statutory provisions
permit a secret vote must fall to this constitutional requirement.
So what did the Nebraska Supreme Court say in Marks about this
constitutional argument? Nothing. The supreme court did not say
anything about what the words "roll call" mean in the constitution. It
said not one word about the enactment history which so clearly indi-
cates that the Constitution requires public votes. It did not explain
how statutory provisions can override constitutional commands.
2. Do the Statutes Regulating Judicial Nominating
Commissions Require a Public Vote?
The Marks decision would be wrong even if the constitution did not
35. 1972 NEB. LEGIS. J. 747.
36. 1972 NEB. LEGIS. J. 1156.
37. March 9, 1972, Floor Debate on Amendments to LB 1199 (no pagination).
38. See, e.g., NEB. CONST. art. III, § 11 (voting in Unicameral must be public); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 84-1405 (Reissue 1971)(repealed 1975)(voting in all political subdivi-
sions must be public); NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-1413 (Reissue 1987)(voting in all polit-
ical subdivisions must be public).
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so clearly require a public vote. Nebraska statutes also require a pub-
lic vote.
In Marks, the Nebraska Supreme Court began by recognizing that
the Nebraska statutes require a roll call vote. But then it noted one
thing that the statutes do not say explicitly and two things that the
statutes do say. The court first noted that the statutes do not explic-
itly provide that the roll call vote shall be public or taken at the public
hearing that is required by the statutes. Then the court noted two
statutory provisions that permit judicial nominating commissions to
operate with some degree of secrecy. First, section 24-812 provides
that communications between members of commissions are to be con-
fidential39 and, second, section 24-810(3) permits commissions to hold
private or confidential meetings. 40 The court then stated, without
analysis, that the statutes read "as a whole" permit4 ' judicial nominat-
ing commissions to conduct their vote in secret. 42
Since the court did not provide any analysis, the first thing we
must do to analyze the case is to try to determine why the court thinks
the secrecy-protection statutes permit a secret roll call vote. The
court's burden is heavy here because, as indicated above,43 a secret roll
call vote is a self-contradiction, analagous to an optimistic Eeyore.44
The court's probable analysis was that the secrecy-protection statutes
are intended to encourage full and honest interchange about nominees
by shielding from public view the statements made by members of ju-
dicial nominating commissions. If members could not be assured that
their statements were shielded from public view, they would be reluc-
tant to criticize nominees bluntly and candidly. This policy, the court
must be asserting, extends beyond discussion about candidates to the
voting itself.
The court's probable 45 analysis is in error for two reasons, and the
39. NEB. REv. STAT. § 24-812 (Reissue 1989).
40. NEB. REV. STAT. § 24-810(3)(Reissue 1989).
41. Although the court at this point phrases its result in permissive terms, the court's
later analysis requires that the court find that judicial nominating commissions
must vote in secret. See supra note 19. Thus, everything I state in this section to
undermine the court's holding that commissions may vote in secret is valid afor-
tiori to the court's implicit holding that commissions must vote in secret.
42. Marks v. Judicial Nominating Comm'n, 236 Neb. 429, 431, 461 N.W.2d 551, 553
(1990).
43. See supra notes 20-26 and accompanying text.
44. A. MLNE, WINNIE-THE-POOH (1926); A. MILNE, THE HOUSE AT POOH CORNER
(1928). These citations reflect the current reading of a father with three pre-
school children.
45. Once again, the court did not provide any analysis in the case; it just stated the
result. As a result, to analyze the decision we must speculate about what the
court's analysis was. I have done my best in this second-best world to state what
the court's probable analysis was. If I am inaccurate, that is unfortunate, but this
type of error can be easily avoided by the court if it simply fulfills its institutional
obligations, ie., if it explains the rationale of its decisions.
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error is confirmed by legislative history. First, the statutes require a
roll call vote, but they merely authorize commissions to act with a
degree of secrecy. Commissions are not required to hold private or
confidential meetings; they need only hold them if the particular com-
mission "determines [them] to be necessary."46 If no private or confi-
dential meetings are held, there are no confidential communications
between members of the commission protected by section 24-812; that
section protects communications "except those at the public hear-
ing"47 and if there is no private or confidential meeting, all of the
communications occur at the public hearing, so none of the communi-
cations are shielded. It is anomalous to read a requirement out of the
statutory framework (the public roll call vote requirement) because of
an arguably46 inconsistent policy that the Legislature did not value
highly enough to require in every case.
The court's probable analysis is also flawed because the policy of
the secrecy-protection statutes can be fully implemented without in-
fringing at all on the policy of the roll call vote requirement. The pol-
icy of the secrecy-protection statutes is to encourage full and frank
deliberations about candidates. That policy would not be infringed at
all by requiring a public vote qfter the deliberations. Indeed, that is
precisely the balance struck by the public meetings law where private
meetings are permitted,4 9 but where voting must be in public.50 Thus,
there is no need to create the oxymoron of a private roll call vote be-
cause the policies of the roll call vote requirement are not at all in
conflict with the policies of the secrecy-protection statutes.
As with the constitutional analysis, if there is lingering doubt about
how the roll call vote requirement and the secrecy authorized by the
secrecy-protection statutes should be reconciled, resort to the Legisla-
ture's intent as expressed in the legislative history is appropriate. The
legislative history is absolutely clear that the Legislature intended the
votes of judicial nominating commissions to be taken in public.
The current statutory language on roll call votes was enacted into
law in 1973 when the Legislature acted to conform the judicial nomi-
nating process to the constitutional amendment which was enacted in
1972. The relevant statutory language prior to that time read: "In se-
lecting judicial nominess, [the judicial nominating] commission shall
vote in executive session by secret ballot."51 As originally introduced,
the amendatory bill, LB 110, merely proposed to delete that sen-
46. NEB. REv. STAT. § 24-810(3)(Reissue 1989).
47. NEB. REv. STAT. § 24-812 (Reissue 1989).
48. See infra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
49. NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-1410 (Reissue 1987).
50. NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-1410(2)(Reissue 1987).
51. NEB. REV. STAT. § 24-809 (Reissue 1964).
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tence.5 2 In response to comments at the hearing on the bill before the
Committee on Judiciary, amendments were proposed (and later
adopted) to change the language to its current form: "In selecting or
rejecting judicial nominees [the judicial nominating] commission shall
vote in executive ssio. by seet ba.t by oral roll call vote. Each
candidate must receive a majority vote of the members of the nomi-
nating commission to have his name submitted to the Governor."m
This amendment by itself clearly indicates that the Legislature in-
tended the roll call vote to be conducted in public. If the Legislature
had merely intended to change the form of the voting from secret bal-
lot to roll call, the Legislature would have stricken only the words "by
secret ballot." But the Legislature intended the amendment to do
more than merely change the form of the voting. By striking the
words "in executive session," the Legislature clearly evidenced its in-
tent that the roll call vote be conducted in public.
The clear message of the amendment that roll call votes by judicial
nominating commissions must be public is affirmed by the statements
of the bill's sponsor and others on the floor of the Legislature. Shortly
before the amendment above was adopted, the interchange that is
cited at the beginning of this Article between Senator Fred Carstens,
the bill's sponsor, and Senator George Syas occurred. The bill's spon-
sor agreed "100%" that the intent of the bill was to require a public
roll call vote.54
Read in light of its legislative history, then, section 24-809W is abso-
lutely clear: The roll call votes of judicial nominating commissions
must be conducted in public. As with the constitutional amendment, I
have been unable to find any evidence in the legislative history that
indicates the Legislature intended to permit the roll call vote of judi-
cial nominating commissions to be held in secret.5 6
Once again, what did the Nebraska Supreme Court say on these
issues in the Marks case? Sadly, the answer once again is nothing.
52. LB 110, 83rd Leg., 1st Sess., 1973 Nebraska Laws 6.
53. 1973 NEB. LEGIS. J. 679 (Italics indicate language added by the amendment.
Strikeover indicates language omitted by the amendment.).
54. March 23, 1973, Floor Debate on LB 110, p. 1847.
55. NEB. REV. STAT. § 24-809 (Reissue 1989).
56. In 1980, a bill was introduced in the Legislature which would have amended the
statutes regulating judicial nominating commissions to require even more explic-
itly that the individual votes of commission members be made public. LB 730,
86th Leg., 2d Sess. 1980 Nebraska Laws § 5(3). Although the bill eventually
passed, 1980 NEB. LEGIS. J. 1380-81, the provision providing for public roll call
votes had been eliminated earlier. 1980 NEB. LEGIS. J. 596-97, 952. It would, of
course, be improper to make any inference about the intent of the 1973 Legisla-
ture based on this failure to act by the 1980 Legislature. R. DICKERSON, THE IN-
TERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 179-83 (1975). See also LB 878,
91st Leg., 2d Sess., 1989 Nebraska Laws (requiring that votes of judicial nominat-
ing commissions be public).
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The supreme court did not say why a required legislative policy (pub-
lic votes) should be overridden by a permissive legislative policy (pro-
tection of commission deliberations). It did not say why it thought the
secrecy-protection statutes were in conflict with the roll call require-
ment. It did not attempt at all to reconcile its decision with the clear
and contrary legislative history.
C. Does the Public Meetings Law Permit a Secret Vote?
Marks' direct claim was under the public meetings law.57 By its
terms, that law seems to have been violated by the procedure used by
the judicial nominating commission in Marks. The statute applies to
"all independent... commissions ... now or hereafter created by con-
stitution, statute, or otherwise pursuant to law."58 Judicial nominat-
ing commissions are independent commissions created by constitution
and statute and, hence, seem to be covered by the statute. The law
requires public roll call votes: "Any action taken... shall be by roll
call vote of the public body in open session." 59 The secret voting of the
judicial nominating commission in this case seems to violate that
provision.60
The Nebraska Supreme Court, as indicated above,61 rejected
Marks' claim under the public meetings law for two reasons. First,
the supreme court said that the more specific statutes regulating judi-
cial nominating commissions took precedence over the public voting
57. Presumably, Marks' direct claim was under the public meetings law because he
had standing under that law. NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-1414(3)(Reissue 1987). See
State ex rel. Schuler v. Dunbar, 208 Neb. 69, 302 N.W.2d 674 (1981). Marks, an
interested private citizen, may not have had standing to raise claims based on the
statutes regulating judicial nominating commissions.
58. NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-1409(1)(Reissue 1987).
59. NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-1413(2)(Reissue 1987). The Nebraska Supreme Court could
have used this statutory language to argue that since the constitutional and statu-
tory language relating to judicial nominating commissions requires only a "roll
call vote," and not a "roll call vote of the public body in open session," an infer-
ence is created that the Legislature intended to permit the roll call votes of judi-
cial nominating commissions to be taken in secret. The argument is swamped,
however, by the purpose for requiring roll call votes in the first place, by other
statutory language that indicates that the Legislature's intent when it uses "roll
call" language is to require a public vote, and by the legislative history which
unequivocally expresses the legislative intention that the votes of judicial nomi-
nating commissions should be conducted in public. In any event, the supreme
court did not rely on this argument in reaching its decision.
60. The public meetings law also imposes other requirements which were not met in
the Marks case. NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-1410(2)(Reissue 1987)(vote must be taken
in open session to go into closed session and body must reconvene in open session
before any formal action is taken); NEB. REv. STAT. § 84-1413(1)(Reissue
1987)(minutes must disclose members present and absent and substance of all
matters discussed).
61. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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requirement of the public meetings law and, second, the court said
that the public meetings law simply did not apply to decisions of judi-
cial nominating commissions.62 The court was quite wrong on these
two points also.
1. Is the Public Voting Requirement of the Public Meetings Law
Overridden by the Statutes Regulating Judicial
Nominating Commissions?
On this issue, the Nebraska Supreme Court determined the rela-
tionship between two sets of statutes-the public meetings law and
the statutes which regulate judicial nominating commissions. The
court held that because the statutes regulating judicial nominating
commissions apply specifically to the procedures used by commissions,
the provisions of those statutes should take precedence over the provi-
sions of the public meetings law, which apply to meetings of govern-
mental bodies generally.63
The supreme court incorrectly stated the canon of statutory inter-
pretation that applies in the case. The supreme court said that the
canon is that "specific statutory provisions relating to a particular sub-
ject control over general provisions."64 The canon actually is that
where there is a conflict, specific statutory provisions control over gen-
eral provisions. Nebraska law is clear that the latter canon is the cor-
rect one-the supreme court has explicitly held that where there is
not a conflict, the canon that a specific law takes precedence over a
general law is inapplicable.65 Where there is not a conflict, the court
should apply the well-accepted canon, in Nebraska and elsewhere,
that statutes in par! materia should be construed together.66
The two cases the supreme court cites in support of the rule-
Lentz v. Saunders67 and Reed v. Parratt 6--do not include the conflict
language in their statements of the rule. The cases, however, do not
hold that no conflict is required for specific statutes to control general
statutes; they simply do not contain the conflict language in their
62. Marks v. Judicial Nominating Comm'n, 236 Neb. 429, 432-33, 46 N.W.2d 551, 553-
54 (1990).
63. Marks v. Judicial Nominating Comm'n, 236 Neb. 429, 432,461 N.W.2d 551, 553-54
(1990).
64. Id.
65. Canada v. State, 148 Neb. 115, 120, 26 N.W.2d 509, 511 (1947); Reusch v. City of
Lincoln, 78 Neb. 828, 832, 112 N.W. 377, 378-79 (1907); State v. Omaha Elevator
Co., 75 Neb. 637, 653, 106 N.W. 979, 983-84 (1906).
66. In Nebraska, see Northwest High School Dist. No. 82 v. Hessel, 210 Neb 219, 223,
313 N.W.2d 656, 658 (1981); Wulf v. Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 188 Neb. 258, 260, 196
N.W.2d 164, 165 (1972); In Estate of Robinson, 138 Neb. 101, 104, 292 N.W. 48, 50
(1940). For citations elsewhere, see 2A SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
§§ 51.01-51.08 (4th ed. 1984 & Cum. Supp. 1990).
67. 199 Neb. 3, 255 N.W.2d 853 (1977).
68. 207 Neb. 796, 301 N.W.2d 343 (1981).
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statements of the canon.69 The supreme court failed to cite or men-
tion in Marks the many cases that correctly state the canon,7 0 includ-
ing cases that the court rediscovered only a couple of weeks after the
Marks decision when it stated the canon correctly.71
The court's result was wrong, however, even under the canon as
incorrectly stated by the court. According to the court's statement of
the canon, the issue of whether judicial nominating commissions are
required to vote in public must be decided by reference only to the
statutes regulating judicial nominating commissions. Since those stat-
69. In Lentz, there was a conflict between the two statutes being considered. One
statute applied only to Class I school districts and required that instruction be
contracted out for a two-year period before dissolution of the district, while the
other applied to all districts and required a five-year period of contracting out
before dissolution. The court held that the more specific statute applied to disso-
lution of Class I districts. Lentz v. Saunders, 199 Neb. 3, 5-6, 255 N.W.2d 853, 855
(1977). Thus, although the court in Lentz did not include the conflict language in
its statement of the canon, it applied the canon in a situation where there was a
conflict.
In Reed, the Nebraska Supreme Court reconciled statutes regulating the pro-
cedures to be used for prison disciplinary proceedings and the procedures of the
Nebraska Administrative Procedure Act. The two procedures were inconsistent
in some respects, but on the precise issue in Reed-the availability of judicial re-
view-arguably there was no conflict. The majority held that the more specific
statute should apply without discussing the issue of whether there was a conflict;
a dissent was filed in which two justices argued that the statutes were not in
conflict and, hence, that the canon should not apply. Thus, application of the
canon in Reed is unclear. Either the court thought there was a conflict between
the two statutes (disagreeing with the dissent) and properly applied the canon, or
the court applied the canon even in the absence of a conflict. The former is the
better interpretation because the latter would mean that Reed overruled sub
silentio a number of prior cases. See cases cited in note 65 supra and note 70
infra. For a critical discussion of Reed, see Potuto, Prison Disciplinary Proce-
dures and Judicial Review Under the Nebraska Administrative Procedure Act, 61
NEB. L. REv. 1 (1982).
70. See Glockel v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 219 Neb. 222, 231, 361 N.W.2d 559,
565 (1985)(general statutes must yield to particular statutes "in cases [in which
there is a] conflict"); State v. Havorka, 218 Neb. 367, 373, 355 N.W.2d 343, 347
(1984)("[w]here general and special provisions of statutes are in conflict," the ca-
non applies); Hall v. Cox Cable of Omaha, Inc., 212 Neb. 887, 894, 327 N.W.2d 595,
600 (1982)(special statute governs over general statute "so far as there is a con-
flict"); Sanitary and Improvement Dist. No. 1 v. County of Adams, 209 Neb. 108,
113, 306 N.W.2d 584, 586-87 (1981)(where the general statute would include the
same matter as the special act and conflict with it, the canon would apply); Com-
munications Workers of Am., AFL-CIO v. City of Hastings, 198 Neb. 668, 670, 254
N.W.2d 695, 697 (1977)("where general and special provisions of statutes are in
conflict," the canon applies).
71. Holdrege Coop. Ass'n v. Wilson, 236 Neb. 541, 548, 463 N.W.2d 312 (1990)(citing
Glockel v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 219 Neb. 222, 361 N.W.2d 559
(1985))("special provisions of a statute in regard to a particular subject will pre-
vail over general provisions in the same or other statutes so far as there is a
conflict").
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utes require a public vote,72 the court was wrong to permit a secret
vote.7 3
The court was also wrong, even accepting its canon of statutory
construction, because of the constitution. In this section of its opinion,
the court conveniently forgot the constitutional provisions that apply
to judicial nominating commissions. 74 The constitutional provisions
are specific to judicial nominating commissions, but even if they were
not, they would control over either set of statutes. As a result, if the
constitution requires a public vote, and it does,7 5 it would take prece-
dence over the specific statutes regulating judicial nominating com-
missions. Thus, either those statutes should be interpreted to require
a public vote to ensure their constitutionality, or the constitution
should be applied directly to require a public vote. Yet the supreme
court, in its opinion, never discusses the meaning of the roll call vote
requirement in the constitution.
But if the court's result was wrong, even accepting its peculiar ca-
non of statutory construction, why did the court bother to misstate the
canon? To answer this question, we need to examine more closely the
court's analysis of the relationship between the two sets of statutes.
The court's discussion was very brief, but the court decided:
1) That specific statutory provisions relating to a particular subject control
over general provisions;76
2) That the statutes which regulate judicial nominating commissions are spe-
cific provisions relating to a particular subject and therefore control over the
public meetings law which is a general statute;7 7 and
3) That the statutes regulating judicial nominating commissions permit either
public or secret voting.78
72. See supra notes 39-56 and accompanying text.
73. The court could have used its misstatement of the canon to mount a procedural
argument. According to the court's canon, the public meetings law is inapplica-
ble; the issue is controlled by the more specific statutes which regulate judicial
nominating commissians. Marks, however, had standing only under the public
meetings law. NEB. AEV. STAT. § 84-1414(3)(Reissue 1987). Even if the statutes
relating to judicial nominating commissions require a public vote, Marks would
not have standing to assert those claims and, therefore, it was appropriate to dis-
miss his case. This argument is available only because the canon of statutory
interpretation is misstated and, in any event, the court did not make it.
74. Marks v. Judicial Nominating Comm'n, 236 Neb. 429, 432, 461 N.W.2d 51, 553-54
(1990). This is in contrast to earlier in the opinion when the court cites the Ne-
braska Constitution, but fails to grant it any weight. Id. at 431, 461 N.W.2d at 553.
75. See supra notes 30-38 and accompanying text.
76. Marks v. Judicial Nominating Comm'n, 236 Neb. 429, 432, 461 N.W.2d 551, 553
(1990).
77. Id. at 432, 461 N.W.2d at 554.
78. The court is not as explicit on this as one might hope, but it does use a permissive
rather than a mandatory term in its holding.
[The statutes regulating judicial nominating commissions provide] that a
judicial nominating commission may select or reject nominees ... in a
private or confidential meeting, provided the vote is taken by an oral
roilcall [sic].
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The court's principal error in the case was on the third point, but ac-
cepting that as a correct interpretation for the moment, the court's
misstatement of the canon of statutory construction permitted it to
avoid the troublesome issue of whether there was a conflict between
that interpretation and the requirements of the public meetings law.
According to the court's canon, its interpretation governed the case
whether there was a conflict or not. According to the correctly-stated
canon, the court's interpretation controlled only if there was a con-
flict; in the absence of a conflict, the two statutes would be harmo-
nized rather than prioritized.79
Still accepting the court's interpretation of the statutes regulating
judicial nominating commissions as stated in three above, the issue of
whether there is a conflict between that interpretation and the public
meetings law is troublesome. Under the court's interpretation, judi-
cial nominating commissions have the discretion to hold their votes in
public or private. The public meetings law requires the votes to be in
public.80 Thus, there is no conflict in the sense that one law requires
A and the other requires not-A. Rather, one law permits A or B and
the other requires A. For two reasons, that is probably not a conflict
in this context.8 1
First, the burden to demonstrate a conflict should be quite heavy in
this case. The burden should be heavy because finding a conflict
would preserve the option of holding votes in secret and the public
policy of this state is to construe the public meetings law liberally and
to construe narrowly and strictly claims that public meetings can be
closed to the public.8 2 The burden should also be heavy because find-
ing a conflict means that a section of the public meetings law-the
section which requires a public vote-is impliedly repealed by the
court and implied repeals are disfavored. And the burden should be
heavy because any conflict arises in the face of a statute that clearly
requires open voting,8 3 that by its terms covers judicial nominating
commissions,8 4 and that does not recognize any conflict within its own
Id. at 432, 461 N.W.2d at 553. But see note 19 supra.
79. With apologies to Jesse Jackson. See supra note 66.
80. NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-1410(2)(Reissue 1987).
81. Clearly, there could be a conflict in other contexts. Specifically, if the legislature
clearly intended one law to preserve a choice between A and B and the other law
required A, there would be a conflict. In this context, there is no evidence that
the legislature clearly intended to preserve a choice between public and secret
voting. Indeed, to the extent there is ambiguity on this point in the legislation
itself, the legislative history of bath the constitution and the statutes clearly indi-
cates that the legislature not only did not intend to preserve choice, it intended to
require public voting. See supra notes 27-56 and accompanying text.
82. Grein v. Board of Educ., 216 Neb. 158, 164-65, 343 N.W.2d 718, 723 (1984).
83. NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-1410(2)(Reissue 1987).
84. The public meetings law applies to "all independent... commissions... now or
hereafter created by the Constitution of Nebraska, statute, or otherwise pursuant
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terms8 5 even though it was enacted close in time to the statutes regu-
lating judicial nominating commissionsss so the Legislature should
have been constructively8 7 and actually85 aware of any conflict be-
tween the two statutes.
Second, this burden of demonstrating a conflict cannot be met be-
cause the two sets of statutes can be harmonized so easily and so well.
The statutes which regulate judicial nominating commissions author-
ize commissions to hold private or confidential meetings to consider
candidates.8 9 The public meetings law also permits private or confi-
dential meetings. 90 Neither set of statutes requires private meet-
ings.91 The statutes regulating judicial nominating commissions do
not discuss the procedural mechanisms for entering into or exiting
to law." NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-1409(1)(Cum. Supp. 1990). Judicial nominating
commissions are independent commissions created by the constitution and by
statute and, hence, are unquestionably covered by the statute.
85. The Legislature demonstrated that it knew how to deal with potential conflicts-
it exempted some bodies from coverage. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 84-1408, 84-1409(1)
(Reissue 1987). Judicial nominating commissions were not exempted from
coverage.
86. The public meetings law was enacted in 1975; the relevant portions of the statutes
regulating judicial nominating commissions were enacted in 1973.
87. Sanitary and Improvement Dist. No. 222 v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 201 Neb.
10, 14, 266 N.W.2d 73, 75 (1978).
88. Thirty-seven of the 49 state legislators were the same in 1973 when the relevant
laws regulating judicial nominating commissions were enacted and in 1975 when
the current public meetings law was enacted. 1 NEB. LEGIS. J. v-vii (1973); 1 NEB.
LEGIS. J. iv-vi (1975).
89. NEB. REV. STAT. § 24-810(3)(Reissue 1989).
90. NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-1410 (Reissue 1987).
91. The court hints in its opinion that perhaps the statutes regulating judicial nomi-
nating commissions require a private vote. See supra note 19. The court notes
that the statutes do not explicitly require a public vote and that they provide that
all communications between members of judicial nominating commissions shall
be confidential. Marks v. Judicial Nominating Comm'n, 236 Neb. 429, 431, 461
N.W.2d 551, 553 (1990). The statutes, however, do not require a private vote. The
statute reads: "[The Commission] shall hold such additional private or confiden-
tial meetings as it determines to be necessary." Thus, private meetings are not
required. Commissions might complete their business at the required public
meeting and, as a result, determine that no additional meetings at all are re-
quired. Or they might decide to hold additional meetings, hut determine that
private or confidential meetings are not necessary. Both options are clearly per-
mitted by the statutory language. On the confidentiality issue, the court ne-
glected to mention that the confidentiality protections extend to communications
"except those at the public hearing." NEB. REV. STAT. § 24-812 (Reissue 1989).
Thus, the confidentiality protections do not require a secret meeting because they
do not extend to communications at the public hearing. Since the statutes do not
require a secret meeting, they do not require a secret vote afortiori. To the ex-
tent the statutes are ambiguous, the legislative history clearly indicates that the
Legislature did not intend to require a secret vote; it intended the exact opposite.
See supra notes 39-56 and accompanying text.
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from closed sessions; the public meetings law does.92 Both sets of stat-
utes require roll call votes.9 3 There are no apparent conflicts between
the statutes and no difficulties in reconciling them.94
For multiple reasons, then, the court was wrong in deciding that
the public voting requirement of the public meetings law was overrid-
den by the more specific requirements of the statutes regulating judi-
cial nominating commissions.
2. Does the Public Meetings Law Apply to Decisions of Judicial
Nominating Commissions?
The Nebraska Supreme Court also provided another reason for its
holding that the public meetings law did not apply to decisions of judi-
cial nominating commissions. The court said that the intent section of
the public meetings law indicated that the "main purpose" of the law
was to ensure that public policy is formulated at open meetings. The
court then asserted that the selection of nominees for judicial vacan-
cies "with certainty" does not involve the formation of public policy.
Thus, the court concluded that the act of selecting nominees fell
outside the purview of the public meetings law.95
92. NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-1410 (Reissue 1987).
93. NEB. REV. STAT. § 24-809 (Reissue 1989); NEB. REv. STAT. § 84-1413(2)(Reissue
1987).
94. There are hypothetical possibilities for conflict between the two statutes. The
statutes regulating judicial nominating commissions, although not clear on the
issue, appear to permit commissions to hold private meetings to deliberate on
candidates. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 24-810(3), 24-812 (Reissue 1989). The public meet-
ings law, on the other hand, may require open meetings even for deliberations.
Section 84-1410(1) requires open meetings for deliberations 1) on "the appoint-
ment or election of a new member to any public body" and 2) if an applicant
requests an open meeting. NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-1410(1)(Reissue 1987). This con-
flict is hypothetical because of uncertainties in how both sets of statutes should be
interpreted. First, the statutes which regulate judicial nominating commissions
do not require private meetings for deliberations, so an interpretation of those
statutes which recognized that private meetings were merely permissive would
avoid a conflict. Second, the cited provisions of the public meetings do not clearly
require open deliberations. Judicial nominating commissions, arguably, do not
appoint or elect new members to a public body; instead they nominate persons
who might later be appointed to a public body by the Governor. And an applicant
has a right to a public meeting upon request only if the closed meeting was con-
templated to prevent injury to that person's reputation. In this context, arguably,
the closed meeting is contemplated to protect the integrity 6f the commissioners'
discussions about the candidate, not to protect the requesting candidate's reputa-
tion. These interpretations of the public meetings law would also avoid a conflict.
In any event, these hypothetical conflicts were irrelevant to the issue addressed
in Marks. These conflicts, even if they were found to exist, would not justify use
of the maxim where there was no conflict. Specifically, it would not justify use of
the maxim to permit a roll call vote in closed session, an issue on which there is
no conflict whatsoever between the two sets of statutes.
95. Marks v. Judicial Nominating Comm'n, 236 Neb. 429, 433, 461 N.W.2d 551, 554
(1990).
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The first premise in this argument is that the requirements of the
public meetings law only apply to the formation of "public policy." If
public policy is not being formed, the law simply does not apply. For
this holding, the court relies solely on language in the intent section of
the public meetings law.96 So one might be tempted to ask, although
the Nebraska Supreme Court apparently was not, what role should
the intent sections of statutes play in the interpretation of those stat-
utes? Sound principles of statutory interpretation indicate that intent
sections can be relied on to clarify ambiguous provisions of statutes,
but should not be used independently to assign meaning to statutes or
to create ambiguities.97 Some courts have gone further and argued
that intent sections are not an operative section of a statute at all, that
an intent section is "no part of the [statute]." 98
The court's use of the intent section of the public meetings law,
then, violates normal interpretative principles. The supreme court's
"public policy" standard does not clarify any ambiguity presented in
Marks by the coverage provisions of the statute; instead, it introduces
ambiguity. Application of the statute's principal coverage sections
seemed clear in the Marks case. The statute covers public bodies and
judicial nominating commissions unambiguously fell within the defini-
tion of public body.99 The statute requires all "meetings" of public
bodies to be open and defines meetings as "all regular, special, or
called meetings, formal or informal, of any public body for the pur-
poses of briefing, discussion of public business, formation of tentative
policy, or the taking of any action of the public body."100 Prior to the
96. NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-1408 (Reissue 1987). See Marks v. Judicial Nominating
Comm'n, 236 Neb. 429, 433, 461 N.W.2d 551, 554 (1990).
97. 1A SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §§ 20.12 (4th ed. 1984 & Cum. Supp.
1990). It should be noted that there is no inconsistency between arguing that
expressions of legislative intent should be disregarded here, while at the same
time arguing, as I have earlier, that expressions of legislative intent in the enact-
ment of the constitutional and statutory provisions relating to judicial nominating
commissions should be regarded seriously. The basic principle of statutory inter-
pretation that is being applied consistently is that reference to legislative intent is
permissible only to resolve ambiguities. Sun Ins. Co. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 169 Neb.
94, 112, 98 N.W.2d 692, 702 (1959). With respect to the public meetings law, the
statute was not ambiguous on the issues the court was addressing so resort to
legislative intent was improper. With respect to the roll call vote requirements of
the constitution and statutes, there was ambiguity on the issues the court was
addressing so resort to legislative intent would have been proper.
98. Brown v. Kirk, 64 IM. 2d 144, 152, 355 N.E.2d 12, 16-17 (1976). See also Bissette v.
Colonial Mortgage Corp., 477 F.2d 1245, 1246 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Council of Ha-
waii Hotels v. Agsalud, 594 F. Supp. 449, 453 (D. Haw. 1984).
99. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
100. NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-1409(2)(Cum. Supp. 1990)(emphasis added). The public
meetings law permits closed sessions for discuSsion of certain issues, NEB. REV.
STAT. § 84-1410(1)(Reissue 1987), but requires the meeting to be reconvened in
open session before any formal action is taken. NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-1410(1)(Re-
issue 1987). Thus, the public meetings law, on its face, permits judicial nominat-
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court's decision, the statute clearly seemed to apply to meetings of ju-
dicial nominating commissions.10 1
The court's decision amends the coverage provisions of the public
meetings law. The law says it applies when public bodies are taking
any action;102 the court says the law applies only when public bodies
are taking action that involves the formation of public policy. At the
very least, the court introduces ambiguity into the coverage of the
public meetings law. Judicial nominating commissions, and indeed all
public bodies, are now covered by the law only to the extent they are
forming "public policy," but the court provides us with only very lim-
ited guidance on what that phrase means. 0 3
The court's reliance on the intent section of the public meetings
law in Marks encourages claims based on the intent sections of other
laws. The intent section of the Nebraska equal pay act, for example,
says that the act is intended to implement comparable worth,10 4 even
though the body of the act requires only equal pay for equal work.10 5
Thus, if the court treats this intent section as it did the one in Marks,
the language on comparable worth would override the otherwise un-
ambiguous language on equal pay. Marks encourages attorneys to for-
ward this type of argument based on the language in intent sections of
statutes, even though such arguments would have been considered
frivolous before Marks and even though the Legislature did not antici-
pate that intent sections would have such a powerful effect.l0 6
The second premise of the court's decision on this issue is that the
selection of nominees for judicial vacancies "with certainty" does not
ing commissions to discuss candidates in private, but commissions are required to
conduct their voting in public. See supra note 94.
101. Remember, the court was not arguing here that the public meetings law did not
apply because of some inconsistency with the statutes regulating judicial nomi-
nating commissions. In this part of its decision, the court was asserting that the
public meetings law on its own terms did not apply to judicial nominating
commissions.
102. NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-1409(2)(Cum. Supp. 1990).
103. See infra note 112 and accompanying text.
104. ' The practice of discriminating on the basis of sex by paying wages to employees
of one sex at a lesser rate than the rate paid to employees of the opposite sex for
comparable work on jobs which have comparable requirements [leads to all kinds
of dire and evil results]." NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-1219(1)(Reissue 1988)(emphasis
added).
105. "No employer shall discriminate ... on the basis of sex [by paying unequal wages]
for equal work on jobs which require equal skil4 effort and responsibility under
similar working conditions." NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-1221 (Reissue 1988)(emphasis
added).
106. Such arguments would have been considered frivilous before Marks and the Leg-
islature did not anticipate that intent sections would have such an effect for the
same reason-because it was so well-accepted before Marks that language in the
intent section of a statute could not override unambiguous language in the body
of the statute. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 70:277
JUDICIAL NOMINATING COMMITTEE
involve the formation of public policy. 0 7 The premise is ironic given
its source, and the irony is enhanced by the "with certainty" language.
The claim is made in a case in which the court ignores the public pol-
icy established by the Legislature which requires open voting and in-
stead implements its own view of how judicial nominating
commissions should operate. It is made in the face of a statute which
explicitly states that open meetings are required for "the appointment
or election of a new member to any public body."108 It is made by a
court which establishes public policy even to the extent of regularly
citing its own opinions as support for the existence of a particular pub-
lic policy,109 by a court which has discussed public policy in 157 of its
cases since 1980.110 On the hierarchy of bodies in this state which es-
tablish public policy, the court has now held that judicial nominating
commissions rank somewhere below county agricultural societies.'n
But the court has held that the selection of nominees for judicial
vacancies does not involve the formation of public policy, and hence is
not subject to the public meetings law. So what does that mean for the
scope of application of the public meetings law in the future? The
court is not very informative, but presumably it means that public
bodies are subject to the public meetings law only when they are actu-
ally engaged in the formation of public policy. So the appointment of
people to public bodies would never be subject to the public meetings
law because that is not actually forming public policy, it is only decid-
ing who will form public policy.1 2 Public bodies engaged in adjudica-
tory functions would never be subject to the law because those bodies
are applying public policy, not forming it. Public bodies engaged in
executive functions would never be subject to the law because those
bodies are enforcing public policy. Even public bodies engaged in leg-
islative functions would be subject to the law only if the particular
decision at issue rose to some unspecified level of public importance.
107. Marks v. Judicial Nominating Comm'n, 236 Neb. 429, 433, 461 N.W.2d 551, 555
(1990).
108. NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-1410(1)(Reissue 1987). See supra note 94.
109. See, e.g., State of Nebraska ex rel. Freezer Serv., Inc. v. Mullen, 235 Neb. 981, 987,
458 N.W.2d 245, 249 (1990); Brooke v. Brooke, 234 Neb. 968, 972, 453 N.W.2d 438,
440 (1990); Babb v. United Food and Commercial Workers, 233 Neb. 826, 832, 448
N.W.2d 168, 172 (1989).
110. A Lexis search of Nebraska Supreme Court cases since 1980 indicates that the
phrase "public policy" was used in 157 cases. In a number of the cases, of course,
the phrase was used in contexts in which the court itself was not forming public
policy. But see supra note 109.
111. See Nixon v. Madison County Agric. Soc'y, 217 Neb. 37, 348 N.W.2d 119 (1984).
County agricultural societies are voluntary associations of 20 or more residents of
a county. NEB. REV. STAT. § 2-201 (Reissue 1987).
112. This result is in some conflict with a specific provision of the public meetings law
which requires open meetings for the appointment or election of new members to
public bodies, NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-1410(1)(Reissue 1987), but the Marks case
presented that same conflict and the court was unconcerned with it.
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The ability of government to act in secrecy is dramatically expanded
by the Marks decision. The decision severely weakens the scope and
effect of the public meetings law.
The court then was wrong on both premises of its argument that
the public meetings law on its own terms did not apply to judicial
nominating commissions. The language in the intent section of the
law should not have been used to override language in the principal
sections of the law. And the argument that judicial nominating com-
missions are not involved with the formation of public policy is not
credible and poses a serious threat to the continued viability of the
public meetings law.
IV. CONCLUSION
In Marks, the Nebraska Supreme Court was dramatically off the
mark. To accept the supreme court's decision as correct, one has to be
convinced that the Nebraska Constitution does not require public
votes by judicial nominating commissions, that the statutes which reg-
ulate commissions do not require public votes, and that the public
meetings law does not require public votes. If this Article has been
convincing on any one of those points, the Marks decision was wrongly
decided. But the supreme court was also off the mark in another,
more fundamental sense. The supreme court simply refused to dis-
cuss the issues in the case. Squarely confronting issues is perhaps the
most important institutional obligation of the court, and the court in
Marks failed to fulfill that obligation.
In this Part, I will discuss the effects of Marks in three distinct
areas: On the procedures to be used by judicial nominating commis-
sions, on the viability of the public meetings law, and on the stature of
the Nebraska Supreme Court as an institution. I will also present re-
sponses to the decision which would tend to minimize those effects.
Marks confirms the secret voting procedures currently used by ju-
dicial nominating commissions. One question to ask, then, is whether
those procedures are working well. If they are, Marks does not pres-
ent an especially serious problem on the policy issue (although it may
on the issue of institutional deference).113 On the other hand, if the
procedures are not working well, one needs to ask an additional ques-
tion: Would the change from secret to public voting make any
difference?
The current procedures used by judicial nominating commissions
have generated a considerable amount of criticism. The principal con-
cern is that the process produces too few female judges. There is con-
siderable anecdotal evidence that the process, which now allows the
commission to operate behind the veil of secrecy sanctioned by Marks,
113. See infra pp. 303-04.
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has been manipulated to favor friends, law partners, and even rela-
tives, almost always to the disadvantage of female candidates.n4 The
Nebraska Supreme Court itself has implicitly recognized the existence
of these types of problems by promulgating disqualification rules in-
tended to eliminate the most blatant of these abuses.'n 5
. An empirical analysis of the Nebraska judiciary confirms that the
current system produces too few female judges. If female judges had
been selected in proportion to their numbers in the pool of potential
judges with the necessary experience, Nebraska would have nearly
twice as many female judges-Nebraska would have seven or eight
female supreme court, district court and county court judges, instead
of its current four.116 And this analysis understates the shortage of
114. See Potuto, Commentary The Nebraska Judicial Selection Process, 24 NEBRASKA
TRANSCRnT 26 (Winter 1990). See also REPORT OF NEBRASKA STATE BAR ASSocI-
ATION JUDICIAL NOmINATING COMMIssIoN COMMITTEE, Addendums I & 11 (1989).
115. "Rules for Nebraska Judicial Nominating Commissions," 236 Neb. iii-iv (adopted
September 6,1990). The rules require commissioners to recuse themselves if they
are related to any applicant or if they practice law or have any other profitmaking
venture with an applicant.
116. The proportion of women in the overall pool of potential judges considered by
judicial nominating commissions was estimated by determining the year of gradu-
ation for each current judge, assigning as the pool for that judge the number of
men and women in the graduating class at the University of Nebraska College of
Law for that year, totaling the pools for all the judges, and calculating the propor-
tion of women in the overall pool. The proportion of women in the pool overall
was 6.9%, which would have meant that 7.59 of the 110 judges in the sample
would have been women if the proportion of women selected as judges had been
the same as the proportion of women in the hypothetical pool. (I said "seven or
eight" female judges in the text to avoid the difficult task of discussing the nature
of a judge who is 591 female.)
This analysis was based on the 110 supreme court, district court and county
court judges listed in the 1990 Bar Directory. NEBRASKA STATE BAR ASSOCIA-
TION, THE BAR DIRECTORY: ANNUAL REPORT AND DIRECTORY, 1990 279-87 (1990).
There have been some changes in the judiciary since publication of the Directory
(for example, Judge Janice Gradwohl has been replaced by Judge Mary Doyle),
but no significant changes for purposes of this analysis. Including judges on other
bodies subject to the judicial nominating commission process would not have sig-
nificantly affected the results.
The hypothetical pool developed by this analysis, although not precise, is a
reasonably accurate, low-cost estimate of the actual overall pool faced by judicial
nominating commissions over time. Use of the proportion of women in graduat-
ing classes at the University of Nebraska in the analysis poses two potential bi-
ases. First, use of that measure means that the estimate of women in the
hypothetical pool is lower than it would be if the proportion of women graduates
nationally had been used instead because the increase in the proportion of women
graduates occurred slightly earlier nationally than it did in Nebraska. See infra
note 117. Nevertheless, use of Nebraska graduates as the proxy is probably pref-
erable 1) because Nebraska supplies a significant proportion of the potential
judge candidates and 2) because the proportion of female graduates at Creighton,
the other major supplier of candidates in Nebraska, probably closer reflects the
proportion at the University of Nebraska than the proportion nationally. Use of
Nebraska graduates as a proxy also poses a potential bias because its use means
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female judges because it assumes that judicial nominating commis-
sions have no duty affirmatively to seek out female candidates in an
that the pools for individual judges are not very accurate. Judges who graduated
in the same year but who were appointed in different districts would have the
same proxy pool under the analysis even though the proportion of women candi-
dates may well vary from district to district. Moreover, the pools for individual
judges depend importantly on the particular year in which the judges graduated.
For example, a judge graduating in 1958 had a proxy pool with zero percent wo-
men, while a judge graduating a year later in 1959 had a proxy pool with 90
women; judges graduating in 1974 and 1975 had proxy pools containing 7 and 18%
women, respectively. This bias for individual judges, however, is not very signifi-
cant for purposes of this study where the object was to develop a proxy pool for
potential judges overall.
In essence, this analysis controls for two factors-the number of female law-
yers in the pool and years of experience required to be a judge. The analysis uses
1) graduation statistics at the University of Nebraska College of Law as a proxy
for the number of female lawyers in the pool and 2) the number of years of expe-
rience actually required by judicial nominating commissions and governors to es-
timate the years of experience required to be qualified to be a judge.
On all other factors, the analysis assumes that male and female candidates for
judicial office were equal. The analysis is biased to the extent that that assump-
tion is not true, but the direction of the bias is uncertain in most circumstances
and acquiring the information to determine the direction and extent of any bias
would be costly. Consider, as an example, the argument that the analysis is bi-
ased because it only considers differences between men and women in years of
experience, but not in the quality of experience. One version of the argument is
that private law firm experience provides a higher quality experience than an
equivalent number of years of experience in the public sector, that men are dis-
proportionately employed by private firms and women in the public sector, and
therefore that failure of the analysis to take account of this difference in the qual-
ity of experience results in an overestimation of the number of female judges.
This type of argument raises several issues which, until they are resolved, make
the direction and extent of any bias uncertain. For instance, there is the issue of
whether private law firm experience is actually preferred by judicial nominating
commissions. A significant number of judges, including many male judges, came
to the bench from the public sector. If public sector experience is actually pre-
ferred and women are overrepresented there, then this analysis's estimate of the
number of women judges to expect is too low, rather than too high. Second, the
direction and extent of any bias is uncertain because there may be a less than
proportional number of applicants for judicial vacancies from the private sector
because, among other things, the pay is generally higher there than it is in the
public sector. Thus, even if judicial nominating commissions do prefer private
sector experience and even if men are overrepresented in that sector, the esti-
mate of female judges made by this analysis may not be too high because those
advantages of private sector experience may be overridden by the disproportion-
ately low number of applicants for judicial vacancies received from persons with
experience in the private sector. These types of issues could certainly be ad-
dressed by a more ambitious empirical study, but acquiring the necessary infor-
mation would be costly.
In sum, this empirical analysis indicates that the judicial nominating commis-
sion process as it currently operates in Nebraska produces too few female judges.
The analysis is not definitive, but it is sufficient to shift the burden to those who
would claim that there is not an underrepresentation of women to produce em-
pirical evidence, rather than mere argumentation, to support that viewpoint.
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attempt to reduce their historic underrepresentation as judges. Other
states, and even the federal government (which, under the Reagan ad-
ministration, was not especially sensitive to this issue), have produced
significantly higher proportions of female judges even though the pro-
portion of women in the pool of potential judges is roughly the same as
in Nebraska.117 Nationwide, 8.7 percent of state court judges, 9.9 per-
cent of state supreme court judges and 11.1 percent of federal court
judges are women.1 18 In Nebraska, 3.6 percent of state court judges
overall and zero percent of state supreme court judges are women.- 9
Frankly, I am doubtful that the single change proposed through
the Marks case which would have required judicial nominating com-
missions to vote in public would adequately address this problem with
the current system. The problem has too many causes and is too com-
plex to be solved by such a simple procedural expedient. On the other
hand, we do know that discrimination is more likely to occur in the
dark than in the light,120 so requiring judicial nominating commissions
to operate in the light may reduce the problem, even if only
marginally.
Even if one concludes that the proportion of female judges in Ne-
braska is not a problem or that making the change proposed in Marks
would not address the problem, the Legislature has reason to be con-
cerned about the Marks holding on judicial nominating commissions.
The Legislature clearly expressed its preference for public voting both
in the legislative history of the constitutional amendment and in the
legislative history of the statutes regulating judicial nominating com-
missions. In Marks, the supreme court paid no deference to the Legis-
lature's policy choice. Independently of how it feels on the issue
of female judges, the Legislature might decide to respond to the Marks
117. The proportion of law graduates who are women has been roughly the same na-
tionally and at the University of Nebraska, although the increase in the propor-
tion of women graduates began two or three years earlier nationally. Compare
Proportion of Women and Minorities in Graduating Classes 1948-1987, Letter
from Claudia S. Fisher, Statistical Secretary, Section of Legal Education and Ad-
missions to the Bar, American Bar Association to Steve Willborn (Aug. 2,
1988)(copy on file with University of Nebraska College of Law Library), with
Proportion of Women Graduates, University of Nebraska College of Law, 1891-
1987 (copy on file with University of Nebraska College of Law Library).
118. Secretariat of the National Association of Women Judges (1990)(as reported in
letter to author on file with University of Nebraska College of Law Library).
Figures for state judges are for judges in office in July, 1990; figures for federal
judges are for judges in office in May, 1989.
119. In the listing of judges in the 1990 Bar Directory, four of 110 supreme court, dis-
trict court, and county court judges were female and none out of seven supreme
court judges were female. Nebraska State Bar Association, supra note 116, at
279-87.
120. See, e.g., Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail Car
Negotiations, 104 HARV. L. REV. 817 (1991).
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decision to protect its institutional integrity from judicial
encroachment.
Whether the Legislature decides to respond because of the wo-
men's judges issue or to protect its own institutional integrity, the nar-
row legislative response to Marks would be to amend the statutes
regulating judicial nominating commissions to require a public vote.
That would reaffirm the prior expressions of legislative intent on the
issue and signal the supreme court that when it disregards legislative
intent in making a decision, the Legislature will respond to protect its
integrity. Broader responses would, of course, also be appropriate if
the Legislature were concerned about the women's judges issue.121
The Marks decision also places in jeopardy the continued viability
of the public meetings law. As is detailed above, 22 the "public policy"
exception to the public meetings law threatens to curtail severely the
scope of application of the law. The appropriate legislative response to
this aspect of Marks would be either to amend or repeal the intent
section of the public meetings law.123 The section could be amended
to expand the openness policy of the act beyond "the formation of
public policy," as is evident in the principal sections of the act, or the
section could be repealed, which would leave only the more expansive
openness policies of the principal sections of the act.
Finally, the Marks decision damages the stature of the Nebraska
Supreme Court as an institution. The court was damaged not because
it decided the Marks case incorrectly, but because it failed to discuss
the issues in the case. The refusal was not because the court was una-
ware of the issues in the case. The court knew the legislative history
of the constitutional amendment, and chose to ignore it. The court
knew of the Legislature's intention when it enacted the statutes which
regulate judicial nominating commissions, and chose to ignore it. The
court knew that its statement of the canon of statutory interpretation
to reconcile statutes was incorrect, and stated it that way anyway.1 24
Reason is the currency courts use to maintain and enhance their
institutional authority. They cannot rely on democratic notions, as the
other branches of government do, as an alternative currency. When
the courts reject reason and rely on raw assertion, as the supreme
court did in Marks, they undermine their own legitimacy' 25 and re-
duce, at least marginally, the willingness of others to obey the law vol-
untarily.S2 6 The Nebraska Supreme Court is the only body that can
121. See, e.g., 1990 Neb. Laws 1058.
122. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
123. The "intent" section is the first paragraph of NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-1408 (Reissue
1987).
124. All of these issues were discussed fully in the amicus brief filed in the Marks case.
125. See, e.g., H. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 138-44 (1961).
126. T. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAw (1990).
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address this damage from the Marks decision but, unfortunately, there
are no short-term remedies. The supreme court can limit this damage
only by squarely addressing issues in future cases and attempting to
resolve them in a fair-minded manner so that eventually the Marks
decision is viewed as an aberration in Nebraska Supreme Court deci-
sionmaking, rather than standard practice.
